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ABSTRACT The spread of online misinformation poses serious challenges to societies
worldwide. In a novel attempt to address this issue, we designed a psychological intervention
in the form of an online browser game. In the game, players take on the role of a fake news
producer and learn to master six documented techniques commonly used in the production
of misinformation: polarisation, invoking emotions, spreading conspiracy theories, trolling
people online, deﬂecting blame, and impersonating fake accounts. The game draws on an
inoculation metaphor, where preemptively exposing, warning, and familiarising people with
the strategies used in the production of fake news helps confer cognitive immunity when
exposed to real misinformation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation of the game with
N= 15,000 participants in a pre-post gameplay design. We provide initial evidence that
people’s ability to spot and resist misinformation improves after gameplay, irrespective of
education, age, political ideology, and cognitive style.
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Introduction
The rapid spread of “fake news” and online misinformationis a growing threat to the democratic process (Lewan-dowsky, Ecker, and Cook, 2017; van der Linden, et al.,
2017a; Iyengar and Massey, 2018), and can have serious con-
sequences for evidence-based decision making on a variety of
societal issues, ranging from climate change and vaccinations to
international relations (Poland and Spier, 2010; van der Linden,
2017; van der Linden et al., 2017b; Lazer et al., 2018). In some
countries, the rapid spread of online misinformation is posing an
additional, physical danger, sometimes leading to injury and even
death. For example, false kidnapping rumours on WhatsApp have
led to mob lynchings in India (BBC News, 2018a; Phartiyal,
Patnaik, and Ingram, 2018).
Social media platforms have proven to be a particularly fertile
breeding ground for online misinformation. For example, recent
estimates suggest that about 47 million Twitter accounts (~15%)
are bots (Varol et al., 2017). Some of these bots are used to spread
political misinformation, especially during election campaigns.
Recent examples of inﬂuential misinformation campaigns include
the MacronLeaks during the French presidential elections in 2017
(Ferrara, 2017), the PizzaGate controversy during the 2016 U.S.
Presidential elections, and rumours circulating in Sweden about
the country’s cooperation with NATO (Kragh and Åsberg, 2017).
A broad array of solutions have been proposed, ranging from
making digital media literacy part of school curricula (Council of
Europe, 2017; Select Committee on Communications, 2017), to
the automated veriﬁcation of rumours using machine learning
algorithms (Vosoughi, Mohsenvand, and Roy, 2017) to con-
ducting fact-checks in real-time (Bode and Vraga, 2015; Sethi,
2017). However, decades of research on human cognition ﬁnds
that misinformation is not easily corrected. In particular, the
continued inﬂuence effect of misinformation suggests that cor-
rections are often ineffective as people continue to rely on
debunked falsehoods (Nyhan and Reiﬂer, 2010; Lewandowsky
et al., 2012). Importantly, recent scholarship suggests that false
news spreads faster and deeper than true information (Vosoughi,
Roy, and Aral, 2018). Accordingly, developing better debunking
and fact-checking tools is therefore unlikely to be sufﬁcient to
stem the ﬂow of online misinformation (Chan et al., 2017;
Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook, 2017).
In fact, the difﬁculties associated with “after-the-fact” approa-
ches to combatting misinformation have prompted some
researchers to explore preemptive ways of mitigating the problem
(Cook, Lewandowsky, and Ecker, 2017; van der Linden et al.,
2017b; Roozenbeek and van der Linden, 2018). The main thrust
of this research is to prevent false narratives from taking root in
memory in the ﬁrst place, focusing speciﬁcally on the process of
preemptive debunking or so-called “prebunking”.
Originally pioneered by McGuire in the 1960s (McGuire and
Papageorgis, 1961, 1962; McGuire, 1964; Compton, 2013), inocula-
tion theory draws on a biological metaphor: just as injections con-
taining a weakened dose of a virus can trigger antibodies in the
immune system to confer resistance against future infection, the
same can be achieved with information by cultivating mental anti-
bodies against misinformation. In other words, by exposing people
to a weakened version of a misleading argument, and by pre-
emptively refuting this argument, attitudinal resistance can be con-
ferred against future deception attempts. Meta-analytic research has
found that inoculation messages are generally effective at conferring
resistance against persuasion attempts (Banas and Rains, 2010).
Importantly, inoculation theory was developed well before the
rise of the internet and traditionally, research has focused on
protecting “cultural truisms”, or beliefs so widely held that they
are seldom questioned (“it’s a good idea to brush your teeth”,
McGuire, 1964). In fact, the initial inoculation metaphor was
mostly applied to situations in which people had supportive
preexisting beliefs and attitudes toward an issue. Only recently
have researchers begun to extend inoculation theory to more
controversial issues where people are likely to hold vastly differ-
ent and often polarised belief structures, for example in the
context of climate change (van der Linden et al., 2017b), bio-
technology (Wood, 2007), and conspiracy theories (Banas and
Miller, 2013; Jolley and Douglas, 2017).
Crucially, this line of work ﬁnds that inoculation can still be
effective even when applied to those individuals who have already
been exposed to misinformation (Cook, Lewandowsky, and
Ecker, 2017; Jolley and Douglas, 2017; van der Linden et al.,
2017b). Conceptually, this approach is analogous to the emerging
use of “therapeutic vaccines” administered to those who already
have the disease. Therapeutic vaccines can bolster host defenses
and still induce antiviral immunity (e.g., in the context of chronic
infections and some cancers, see Autran et al., 2004). Similarly,
those who already carry an informational “virus” can still beneﬁt
from inoculation treatments and become less susceptible to future
persuasion and deception attempts. Recent advances in inocula-
tion theory have called for both prophylactic and therapeutic tests
of inoculation principles (Compton, 2019), which is especially
relevant in the context of fake news and misinformation.
Yet, thus far, scholarship has primarily focused on inoculating
study participants against persuasion attempts pertaining to a
particular topic, such as climate change (van der Linden et al.,
2017b) or 9/11 conspiracies (Banas and Miller, 2013). Although
consistent with the initial theory, this approach presents funda-
mental problems in terms of both the scalability (Bonetto et al.,
2018) and generalisability of the “vaccine” across issue domains
(Roozenbeek and van der Linden, 2018). For example, recent
work indicates that issuing a general warning before exposing
participants to misinformation can offer a signiﬁcant inoculation
effect in itself (Bolsen and Druckman, 2015; Cook, Lewandowsky
and Ecker, 2017; van der Linden et al., 2017b). This is consistent
with a larger literature on the effectiveness of forewarnings and
refutation in correcting misinformation (Ecker, Lewandowsky,
and Tang, 2010; Walter and Murphy, 2018).
Importantly, by extending the interpretation of the immuni-
sation metaphor, inoculation could provide a “broad-spectrum
vaccine” against misinformation by focusing on the common
tactics used in the production of misinformation rather than just
the content of a speciﬁc persuasion attempt. For example,
inoculation messages are known to spill-over to related but
untreated attitudes, offering a “blanket of protection” (McGuire,
1964; Parker, Rains, and Ivanov, 2016). Moreover, recent research
has provided some support for the idea that inoculation can
emerge through exposing misleading arguments (Cook, Lewan-
dowsky, and Ecker, 2017). Thus, we hypothesise that by exposing
the general techniques that underlie many (political) persuasion
attempts, broad-scale attitudinal resistance can be conferred. In
considering how resistance is best promoted, it is important to
note that prior research has primarily relied on providing passive
(reading) rather than active (experiential) inoculations (Banas
and Rains, 2010). In other words, participants are typically pro-
vided with the refutations to a certain misleading argument.
However, as McGuire hypothesised in the 1960s (McGuire and
Papageorgis, 1961), active refutation, where participants are
prompted to actively generate pro- and counter-arguments
themselves may be more effective, as internal arguing is a more
involved cognitive process. This is relevant because inoculation
can affect the structure of associative memory networks,
increasing nodes and linkages between nodes (Pfau et al., 2005).
Building on this line of work, we are the ﬁrst to implement the
principle of active inoculation in an entirely novel experiential
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learning context: the Fake News Game, a “serious” social impact
game that was designed to entertain, as well as educate. Previous
work has shown that social impact games are capable of
prompting behavioural change, for example, in the domain of
health (Thompson et al., 2010). We posit that providing cognitive
training on a general set of techniques within an interactive and
simulated social media environment will help people apply these
skills across a range of issue domains.
Accordingly, we developed a novel psychological intervention
that aimed to confer cognitive resistance against fake news stra-
tegies. The intervention consisted of a freely accessible browser
game that takes approximately 15 minutes to complete. The
game, called Bad News, was developed in collaboration with the
Dutch media platform DROG (DROG, 2018; BBC, 2018b). The
game engine is capable of rendering text boxes, images, and
Twitter posts to simulate the spread of online news and media.
The game is choice-based: players are presented with various
options that will affect their pathway throughout the game. Figure 1
shows a screenshot of the game’s landing page.
In the game, players take on the role of a fake news creator.
The purpose is to attract as many followers as possible while also
maximising credibility. The follower and credibility metres along
with a screenshot of the game environment are shown in Fig. 2.
Throughout the game, players gain followers and credibility by
going through a number of scenarios, each focusing on one of six
strategies commonly used in the spread of misinformation
(NATO StratCom, 2017). At the end of each scenario, players
earn a speciﬁc fake news badge (an overview of the fake news
badges is provided in Fig. 3). Players are rewarded for making use
of the strategies that they learn in the game, and are punished (in
terms of losing credibility or followers) for choosing options in
line with ethical journalistic behaviour. They gradually go from
being an anonymous social media presence to running a (ﬁc-
tional) fake news empire. Players lose if their credibility drops to
0. The total number of followers at the end of the game counts as
their ﬁnal score.
There are six badges for players to earn, each reﬂecting a
common misinformation strategy (see Fig. 3). The ﬁrst badge is
called “impersonation” and covers deception in the form of
impersonating online accounts. This includes posing as a real
person or organisation by mimicking their appearance, for
example by using a slightly different username. This technique is
commonly used on social media platforms, for example when
impersonating celebrities, politicians, or in certain money and
various other online scams (Goga, Venkatadri, and Gummadi,
2015; Jung, 2011; Reznik, 2013).
The second badge covers provocative emotional content: Pro-
ducing material that deliberately plays into basic emotions such as
fear, anger, or empathy, in order to gain attention or frame an
issue in a particular way. Research shows that emotional content
leads to higher engagement and is more likely to go viral and be
remembered by news consumers (Aday, 2010; Gross and
D’Ambrosio, 2004; Konijn, 2013; Zollo et al., 2015).
The third badge teaches players about group polarisation:
Artiﬁcially amplifying existing grievances and tensions between
different groups in society, for example political differences, in
order to garner support for or antagonism towards partisan
viewpoints and policies (Groenendyk, 2018; Iyengar and Kru-
penkin, 2018; Melki and Pickering, 2014; Prior, 2013).
The fourth badge lets players ﬂoat their own conspiracy the-
ories: Creating or amplifying alternative explanations for tradi-
tional news events which assume that these events are controlled
by a small, usually malicious, secret elite group of people (Jolley
and Douglas, 2017; Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer, 2013;
van der Linden, 2015).
The ﬁfth badge covers the process of discrediting opponents:
Deﬂecting attention away from accusations of bias by attacking or
delegitimising the source of the criticism (Rinnawi, 2007; Lischka,
Fig. 1 The “Bad News Game” intro screen (www.getbadnews.com)
Fig. 2 Example tweet in the Bad News Game. Note: Follower and credibility metres are shown on the left-hand side
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2017), or by denying accusations of wrongdoing altogether
(A’Beckett, 2013).
The last badge educates players about the practice of trolling
people online. In its original meaning, the term trolling refers to
slowly dragging a lure from the back of a ﬁshing vessel in the
hope that the ﬁsh will bite. In the context of misinformation, it
means deliberately inciting a reaction from a target audience by
using bait, making use of a variety of strategies from the earlier
badges (Grifﬁths, 2014; McCosker, 2014; Thacker and Grifﬁths,
2012).
Methods
Sample and procedure. The game (‘Bad News’) is an interactive
choice-based adventure (see Figs. 1–3). Players are shown a short
text or image (such as a meme or an article headline) and can
react to them in a variety of ways. Selecting an option that is in
line with what a real producer of misinformation would choose
earns players more followers and credibility. If, however, they lie
too blatantly to their followers, choose an option that is overtly
ridiculous, or act too much in line with journalistic best practices,
the game either nudges followers onto a different path or lowers
their credibility score.
As mentioned, during the approximately 15 minutes of
playtime, players earn 6 badges by learning to apply six common
misinformation techniques, namely: (1) impersonating people
online (Goga, Venkatadri, and Gummadi, 2015; Jung, 2011;
Reznik, 2013), (2) using emotional language (Aday, 2010; Gross
and D’Ambrosio, 2004; Konijn, 2013; Zollo et al., 2015), (3) group
polarisation (Groenendyk, 2018; Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018;
Melki and Pickering, 2014; Prior, 2013), (4) ﬂoating conspiracy
theories (Jolley and Douglas, 2017; Lewandowsky, Gignac, and
Oberauer, 2013; van der Linden, 2015) and building echo
chambers (Flaxman, Goel, and Rao, 2016), (5) discrediting
opponents (A’Beckett, 2013; Lischka, 2017; Rinnawi, 2007), and
(6) trolling people online (Grifﬁths, 2014; McCosker, 2014;
Thacker and Grifﬁths, 2012) and false ampliﬁcation (NATO
StratCom, 2017).
Participants were recruited through a press release with the
university (the headline read; “Fake news ‘vaccine’: online game
may ‘inoculate’ by simulating propaganda tactics). The release
explained the research programme and provided an online web
link to the game. The release was picked up by news outlets such
as the BBC, which also provided a link to the game (BBC, 2018b).
As such, we relied on a convenience sample in that anyone with
an internet connection could visit the game website and
participate. Using a traditional within-subjects design, the game
featured a voluntary in-game (pre-post) survey for a period of
three months. A few minutes into the game, we asked players if
they wanted to participate in a scientiﬁc study. After players gave
informed consent, we collected N= 43,687 responses over the
three-month period following its launch (Feb–April 2018), which
included n= 14,266 completed paired pre-post responses (the
exact sample size and response rate differed slightly depending on
the question, ranging from n= 14,163 to n= 14,266). All
participants were automatically assigned a unique session ID
and any duplicates were removed prior to analysis. The study was
approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee (PRE.2018.007). Socio-demographic variables were mea-
sured during the test, including gender (male, female, other), age
(under 18, 19–29, 30–49, 50+), political orientation (measured on
a 7-point scale where 1 is very left-wing and 7 is very right-wing),
and highest education completed (high school or less, some
college, higher degree). We also included the ball and bat-question
from Frederick’s cognitive reﬂection test (Frederick, 2005).
Given that the sample is self-selected and not representative of
any particular population, the general distribution of the sample
was skewed toward males (75%), higher educated (47%), younger
(18–29, 47%), and somewhat-to-very-liberal (59%) individuals.
Nonetheless, the sample size still allowed us to collect relatively
large absolute numbers of respondents in each category (please
see Suppl. Table S1 for full details on the sample and attrition).
Measures. The key dependent variable measured in the survey
was respondents’ ability to recognise misinformation strategies in
the form of misleading tweets and news headlines. Participants
were asked to rate the reliability of these tweets and headlines on
a standard 7-point scale (1= unreliable, 7= reliable), both before
and after playing. Because we did not want to overburden players
with an excessively long survey, participants answered 6 questions
in total (aside from the demographic questions), 2 of which were
control questions that did not contain any deceptive techniques
or strategies. Figure 4 shows a screenshot example of a survey
question in the game module. The control questions were framed
as tweets from legitimate news organisations that did not include
any attempts at misleading the audience. The statements in these
tweets were chosen to reﬂect global news events among English
speakers. The ﬁrst control question was a tweet by the New York
Times, stating: President Trump wants to build a wall between the
Fig. 3 The 6 badges that players earn throughout the game after successfully mastering a misinformation technique
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United States and Mexico. The second was a tweet by the Wall
Street Journal, stating #Brexit, the United Kingdom’s exit from the
European Union, will ofﬁcially happen in 2019. The “real” items
helped control for social desirability: if participants simply
become more skeptical about all headlines they are shown, we
would expect that they also rate the control items as signiﬁcantly
less reliable after playing.
Due to bandwidth and data storage limitations, the treatment
questions reﬂected a random sample of the strategies included in
the game: impersonation, conspiracy, and discrediting. Following
the game’s global popularity (BBC News, 2018b), additional data
was gathered on polarisation. For impersonation, we used a well-
known Twitter account with slight alterations in its username and
avatar making a believable but untrue claim: participants were
shown a tweet from an account impersonating the cable television
company HBO, stating that The 8th season of #GameOfThrones
will be postponed due to a salary dispute. This echoes a recent
real-life example, where an impostor created a fake Twitter
account imitating billionaire investor Warren Buffett. Although
Buffett’s name was misspelled as “Buffet”, the account quickly
gained a large following (BBC News, 2018c).
For the conspiracy question, participants were shown a tweet
from a non-existent news site (Daily Web News) making a
conspiratorial (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009) claim: The Bitcoin
exchange rate is being manipulated by a small group of rich
bankers. #InvestigateNow. For the question about discrediting we
used a different non-existent news site (“International Post
Online”), employing an ad hominem (Walton, 1998) argument
against the mainstream media: The Mainstream Media has been
caught in so many lies that it can’t be trusted as a reliable news
source. #FakeNews. And ﬁnally, for polarisation, we showed
participants an invented news headline that was randomised to
state either that a New study shows that left-wing people lie far
more than right-wing people, or the reverse (New study shows that
right-wing people lie far more than left-wing people). We included
this random element mainly to control for participants’ political
ideology. We hypothesised that people would rate each of the
treatment (but not the control) items as less reliable after playing
the game, thus displaying a cognitive inoculation effect.
Results
The main results are displayed in Fig. 5. We analysed between
N= 14,163 and N= 14,266 repeated within-subject measures
from a survey embedded within the game. The exact number of
pre-post completes varied slightly for each badge (see Supple-
mentary Information for details). Participants rated the reliability
of six headlines and tweets pre-and-post gameplay corresponding
to some of the deception strategies that can be earned in the
game: impersonation, ﬂoating conspiracies, discrediting oppo-
nents, political polarisation, as well as two “real” news control
items (please also see “Methods”).
Main effects of the intervention. A one-way repeated measures
MANOVA on the ﬁve measures revealed a signiﬁcant main effect,
F(5, 13559)= 980.65, Wilk’s Λ= 0.73, p < 0.001, η2= 0.27. We
subsequently conducted a series of univariate follow-up com-
parisons with ﬁve paired t-tests using a conservative Bonferroni
correction (α= 0.01). However, given the large sample size, fol-
lowing Lakens (2013) we encourage the reader to also evaluate
effect-sizes (Cohen’s dz, Hedges gav) in addition to statistical
signiﬁcance. Furthermore, we provide violin plots visualising the
full density distribution of the pre- and post-changes (Figs. 6 and 7).
Although statistically signiﬁcant, there were no meaningful
differences in the pre-scores and post-scores of the “real” control
Fig. 4 Example of “training” and “testing” in the Bad News Game. Note: The top panel illustrates how a technique [impersonation] is used in the game, and
the bottom panel shows how the same technique is used in a different example on which participants were evaluated before and after playing
Fig. 5 Bar graph of pre (light grey) and post (dark grey) reliability
judgments of control (real) and fake news items. Note: Error bars represent
95% conﬁdence intervals
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Fig. 6 Violin plots showing the kernel density distribution of pre-judgements and post-judgements with point estimates (block dots). Note: control “real”
news items (collapsed, panel a), impersonation (panel b), conspiracy (panel c), and deﬂection (panel d)
Fig. 7 Violin plots showing the kernel density distribution of pre-reliability and post-reliability judgements with median box plots (horizontal bars). Note:
political ideology (panel a), age (panel b), education (panel c), and cognitive reﬂection (panel d)
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headlines participants were presented with surrounding Donald
Trump (control1), Mpre= 5.85, Mpost= 5.89, Mdiff= 0.04, [95%
CI 0.02, 0.06], t(14204)= 3.78, p= 0.002, d= 0.03, Hedges
g= 0.02 and Brexit (control2), Mpre= 6.34, Mpost= 6.29,
Mdiff=−0.05, [95% CI −0.03, −0.07], t(14265)=−5.13,
p < 0.0001, d= 0.04, Hedges g= 0.04. In contrast, there were
both statistically signiﬁcant and much larger differences in the
pre-scores and post-scores for the fake tweets and headlines for
each of the badges. Speciﬁcally, there was a signiﬁcant decrease in
reliability ratings for impersonation, Mpre= 3.00, Mpost= 2.30,
Mdiff=−0.71, [95% CI −0.67, −0.74], t(14224)=−43.42, p <
0.0001, d= 0.36, Hedges g= 0.33, conspiracy, Mpre= 2.47,
Mpost= 1.97, Mdiff=−0.50, [95% CI −0.48, −0.53], t(14217)=
−41.83, p < 0.0001, d= 0.35, Hedges g= 0.32 and deﬂection,
Mpre= 2.37, Mpost= 1.92, Mdiff=−0.45, [95% CI −0.43, −0.48],
t(14162)=−35.94, p < 0.0001, d= 0.30, Hedges g= 0.26. Nota-
bly, although political polarisation is an important element of
online misinformation, due to technical (storage) issues, data for
the polarisation badge was not collected in the original launch.
However, post-hoc data collection (N= 1770, n= 885 paired)
allowed for an initial evaluation, which suggests a somewhat
lower but still signiﬁcant inoculation effect for polarising
headlines, Mpre= 2.57, Mpost= 2.30, Mdiff=−0.26, [95% CI
−0.15, −0.37], t(854)=−4.76, p < 0.0001, d= 0.16, Hedges
g= 0.15. As a robustness check, we estimated all pre-post
changes controlling for key sociodemographic covariates. Results
remain virtually unchanged (see Suppl. Table S2).
Subgroup analyses. Because we did not have any strong a priori
hypotheses to assume that individual differences would exist in
performance across speciﬁc badges, we averaged across items for
ease of interpretation when reporting the subgroup analyses that
follow. Importantly, among those respondents who completed
pre-post assessments for the included fake news badges, the
average inoculation effect was relatively high, Mpre= 2.61,
Mpost= 2.06, Mdiff=−0.55, [95% CI −0.53, −0.57], t(13787)=
−61.21, p < 0.001, d= 0.52, Hedges g= 0.43. Moreover, when
analysed by prior susceptibility, we ﬁnd the largest effects among
those individuals who were most likely to be vulnerable to fake
news on the pre-test. In contrast, we ﬁnd little evidence for
meaningful variation across socio-demographics.
Political ideology. For example, although conservatives rated
fake headlines more reliable than liberals at pre-test, Mcons= 2.85
vs. Mlib= 2.38, Mdiff= 0.47, [95% CI 0.52, 0.42],
t(14032)= 19.66, p < 0.001, d= 0.17, the average learning effect
in post-pre scores between liberals and conservatives did not
differ signiﬁcantly (Fig. 7, panel A), MΔlib=−0.55, MΔcons=
−0.59, Mdiff=−0.04, [95% CI −0.08, 0.04], t(1167)=−1.77,
p= 0.08, d= 0.02. This was also the case for the polarisation-item
speciﬁcally, MΔlib=−0.23, MΔcons=−0.32, Mdiff=−0.09, [95%
CI −0.32, 0.15], t(666)=−0.73, p= 0.46, d= 0.03.
Age, education, gender, and cognitive reﬂection. There was a
signiﬁcant difference for age so that older players adjusted their
reliability ratings somewhat less (Fig. 7, Panel B), although the
standardised difference was so small that it can be considered
negligible, MΔyounger=−0.56, MΔolder=−0.41, Mdiff=−0.15,
[95% CI −0.08, −0.22], t(13666)= 4.37, p < 0.001, d= 0.04.
There was no signiﬁcant difference across education levels (Fig. 7,
panel C),MΔlower=−0.53,MΔhigher=−0.55,Mdiff=−0.03, [95%
CI −0.09, 0.03], t(13675)=−0.87, p= 0.38, d= 0.01 nor across
our single-item measure of cognitive reﬂection (Fig. 7, panel D),
MΔintuitive=−0.56, MΔreﬂective=−0.55, Mdiff=−0.01, [95% CI
−0.02, 0.04], t(13713)=−0.52, p= 0.60, d= 0.004. Lastly, there
was a signiﬁcant gender difference so that females performed
slightly better on average, but the effect-size was once again near
negligible, MΔfemale=−0.66, MΔmale=−0.53, Mdiff=−0.13,
[95% CI −0.09, −0.18], t(13340)= 6.07, p < 0.001, d= 0.05.
Prior susceptibility to fake news. In order to analyse the results
by respondents’ prior susceptibility to fake news, we created a
median split based on how reliable people deemed the fake
headlines to be at pre-test (Mdn= 2.67, M= 2.82, SD= 1.46).
Findings reveal a much larger inoculation effect for those indi-
viduals who were more likely to think that the fake headlines were
reliable at pre-test than those participants who were less sus-
ceptible, MΔlow=−0.19 vs. MΔhigh=−1.06, Mdiff=−0.86, [95%
CI −0.83, −0.90], t(13786)= 51.57, p < 0.001, d= 0.89.
Discussion
We ﬁnd preliminary evidence that the process of active inocu-
lation through playing the Bad News game signiﬁcantly reduced
the perceived reliability of tweets that embedded several common
online misinformation strategies. Although in absolute terms the
standardised effect-sizes across the different badges may indicate
a small to moderate effect, the observed magnitude is broadly in
line with the average effect-size in the context of resistance to
persuasion research (Banas and Rains, 2010; Walter and Murphy,
2018), where small effects are not only common but also mean-
ingful, especially when aggregated across individuals over time
(Funder and Ozer, 2019). For example, using a binomial effect-
size display, consider that a Cohen’s d of just 0.15 could roughly
translate into a change of support for a particular policy by 7%
(e.g., from 43% to 50%). Notably—while our effects were much
larger—inﬂuential elections have been decided on substantially
smaller margins (e.g., the EU Brexit referendum in 2016, 52%
vs. 48%).
Moreover, rather than following the traditional inoculation
approach where the “vaccine” is comprised of a weak dose of
exactly the same (mis)information (refutational-same), the Bad
News Game exposes participants to doses of weakened strategies
and participants are subsequently tested using a range of different
deception examples (refutational-different). The observation that
participants rated both control questions as roughly equally
reliable before and after playing the game underlines this point: it
shows that active inoculation does not merely make participants
more skeptical, but instead trains people to be more attuned to
speciﬁc deception strategies. Or, to continue the metaphor, the
psychological “vaccine” only activates speciﬁc “antibodies”.
Achieving this is much more challenging because participants are
tasked with using active reasoning to recognise a range of com-
mon misinformation strategies in different contexts (rather than
just retrieving facts from memory). In short, we consider these
gains meaningful but encourage future research to further explore
the boundary conditions of inoculation theory, for example, the
extent to which the observed inoculation-effects extend beyond
the game environment.
Furthermore, although we ﬁnd some small variation in our
results in line with previous research, such as that the elderly
(Guess, Nagler, and Tucker, 2019) and conservatives (Grinberg
et al., 2019; Guess, Nagler, and Tucker, 2019) may be more
susceptible to fake news, we ﬁnd no (practically) meaningful
differences in inoculation-effects across genders, education levels,
age groups, or political ideologies. This is a notable ﬁnding in
itself, as our goal was to develop an intervention that could be
used as a”broad-spectrum vaccine” without causing psychological
reactance. This result is further buttressed by the ﬁnding that
those participants who were most susceptible to fake news
headlines at the outset (pre-test) also beneﬁted the most from the
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inoculation treatment. In other words, the vaccine may indeed
help those audiences at greatest risk of misinformation. Of course,
across the sample, the relatively modest susceptibility ratings
indicate a possible ﬂoor effect among those who were already less
likely to believe the fake headlines, as is common in fake news
research (e.g., see Pennycook and Rand, 2018).
In addition, the uniform inoculation-effect across the political
spectrum may be a result of the fact that we crafted each scenario
to be ideologically balanced so that players always have an option
to create fake news about a traditionally right-wing (anti-gov-
ernment) or left-wing (anti-industry) topic. Nevertheless, the
observation that both liberals and conservatives improve in their
ability to detect fake news following gameplay is broadly in line
with the ﬁnding that susceptibility to fake news is at least partially
explained by lack of appropriate reasoning skills rather than
motivated cognition alone (Pennycook and Rand, 2018). Inter-
estingly, prior research in this domain has often exposed parti-
cipants to “real” fake news stories, which introduces a major
memory confound (people may simply know whether a story is
reliable or not because they remember it). Thus, one strength of
the current approach is that the examples in the game are
modelled after real instances of fake news—but ﬁctional in nature
—to rule out memory confounds.
Nonetheless, our study did suffer from a number of necessary
limitations. First, during its ofﬁcial global launch with the uni-
versity, it was not deemed ethical to design an intervention in
which only some people would be randomised to play the Bad
News game. In other words, just like it can be unethical to only
assign some patients to a treatment, because the game is a social
impact initiative that is supposed to be freely accessible to anyone,
refusing half of the visitors the educational beneﬁt would have
been a disappointing experience, especially given the importance
of the fake news debate. We thus lack a traditional control group
and the results should be considered within the context of a non-
randomised pre-post repeated measures design. We have made
efforts to minimise this problem by including two “real news”
control questions. If social desirability (or demand) effects were
salient in the game, participants might have simply rated all items
as less reliable, but this is not what we observed: participants did
not meaningfully adjust their ratings of the “real” control items.
Having said this, the control items were perhaps more likely to
confound reliability with familiarity as their content covered
major news events. Accordingly, alternative explanations cannot
completely be ruled out, especially in the absence of a randomised
control group. Yet, randomised between-subject studies in psy-
chology often suffer from small samples mixed with high
uncertainty around the estimates providing little useful infor-
mation about the phenomenon of interest (Gelman and Carlin,
2014). Thus, there is something to be said in defense of the
precision in our estimates as a result of leveraging a large online
sample (Funder and Ozer, 2019).
Nonetheless, we recognise that the sample was self-selected
(opt-in) and its composition is therefore unbalanced on several
key demographics and not representative of any population
(please see Supplementary Information Table S1 for full details).
For example, the overrepresentation of males could be due to the
fact that online gaming might stereotypically appeal more to men
(Ivory, 2006). Unfortunately, due to the fact that the intervention
was openly accessible for anyone to play, we could not include an
extensive set of scales or multi-item survey questions, as this
would have signiﬁcantly interfered with people’s willingness to
play the game. Thus, we could not ascertain how conﬁdent people
were in their assessments and so the scores may not reﬂect
strongly held beliefs. Importantly, we also did not record any
personally identifying information from participants (including
IP addresses or location) to adhere to the latest European Union
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). Yet we recognise
the important possibility that participation rates may have been
selectively higher among those audiences who would be more
open to learning about fake news in the ﬁrst place.
Lastly, the question can be raised as to whether we are
encouraging people to use these insights to spread fake news or
deceive other people online (i.e., a negative side effect). Although
not empirically tested, we deem this risk extremely low for two
reasons. First, while the game shows how easy it can be to start
spreading deceptive content, the primary motivations for doing
so are often political or ﬁnancial in nature (Kirby, 2016; Gu,
Kropotov and Yarochkin, 2017), neither of which are motivations
elicited or provided by the game. In addition, ramping up an
inﬂuential fake news machinery is very different from learning
what deceptive content looks like. Second, none of the strategies
and techniques shown in the game are secret (NATO StratCom,
2017); they are already being used to spread ‘real’ fake news, the
game is simply helping people gain resistance against them.
Overall, despite these limitations, we highlight the potential of
game-based psychological interventions to combat the problem of
misinformation at the individual level. The participation rate and
overall success of the game as a translational intervention (outside
of the research context) further show that there is a high demand
for evidence-based materials that help stem the ﬂow of online
misinformation. Lastly, the potential of psychological inoculation
against fake news highlights the need to cultivate a “broad-
spectrum” vaccine which targets a wide range of (evolving)
misinformation pathogens. We offer initial evidence of spill-over
effects or “blanket protection” against deception by focusing on
the broader techniques and strategies that underpin the produc-
tion of misinformation more generally rather than targeting only
speciﬁc instances of fake news.
These preliminary ﬁndings open up many avenues for future
research. For example, future studies could improve upon the
current work by designing randomised controlled trials com-
paring the Bad News game against traditional media literacy tools
(across different cultures), as well as model the rate of decay of
the initial inoculation effect; this would yield important insights
into whether and when “booster shots” (replay) may be required.
In short, by designing and testing a novel experiential learning
platform, we hope to have paved a path toward a new line of
behavioural science research aimed at empowering diverse
populations to guard themselves against the spread of mis-
information in society.
Data availability
The data that support the ﬁndings of this study are available from
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.8269763.
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